Abstract:
Political philosophy has been under the sway of a certain picture since
Rawls's A Theory of Justice was published in 1971. This picture combines
the idea that the problem of justice should be approached from
the direction oi ideal normative theory, and that there are some anchoring
ideas that secure the justificatory role of a hypothetical agreement.
I think this picture and the hold it has over political philosophy is
beginning to fragment. This fragmentation I think is most evident in
the skepticism that has become a routine response to the Kantian idea
that 'we' can 'discover' the terms of an agreement that has both a categorical
force and a universal scope. But as the picture fragments we
are still left with the framework and vocabulary of Rawls's difficult
and elaborate theory. The major difficulty confronting the Rawlsian
project (the problem of pluralism as I will argue below) is itself
defined in terms of Rawls's conceptual language. And this serves only
to obscure the real challenge and keep us 'bewitched' by Rawls's narrow
way of seeing issues. In being bewitched in this way we do not see
that the problem of pluralism confronts Rawls's project as a whole,
rather than requiring adjustments and accommodations.
