

LIZ COLEMAN: People in the back should get seats if they like, there's plenty of them up here.

Welcome. Before I introduce our speaker tonight, Larry Diamond, I wanted to welcome our very special guests who are participating in a conference that begins tomorrow morning. This is the keynote for that conference and I just wanted to say their names and ask them if they would again – they've done this once before – stand so that we could all see who you are before we begin the formal speech of the evening.

From Argentina: Gustavo Beliz, are you here? Thank you. Ernesto Seman.

From Indonesia: Bahtiar Effendy, Smita Notosusanto, Ryaas Rasyid.

Zbigniew Bujak, Jerzy Osiatynski, they are from Poland.

From Turkey: Atilla Yayla, and we have another Turkish gentleman who, I think is changing at the moment in order to get here, but maybe he's here – Egemen Bagis, have you gotten here yet? He will be here.

Any how, welcome. A very special welcome to you all.

In addition there are seventeen high school students here from all over the country. They are coming here to cover the conference for their high school newspapers and it is a very, very special pleasure to welcome them also. This will be a journalism, we hope, that imagines that the world might be a genuinely and decent and interesting place. Welcome to the high school journalists as well.

And now, Larry Diamond. To begin with the facts, he is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Professor of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford University, coordinator of the Democracy Program of the New Center for Democracy Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford's Institute for International Studies. He is also co-

director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington which sponsors scholarly research and publications and coordinates an international network of democracy research institutes. Diamond is the founder and co-editor of the *Journal of Democracy* which has been publishing since 1990. He has served as a consultant to the U.S. Agency for International Development known as USAID on the factors that facilitate and obstruct democratic development as well as the interactions between democracy, corruption, economic development and political stability. In its report *Foreign Aid In the National Interest* which proposes a new strategy for United States foreign assistance, Diamond helped to shape that overall strategy emphasizing that improvements in governance is the key to development progress. He has also advised and lectured the World Bank, the United Nations, the State Department, and other governmental and non-governmental agencies dealing with governance and development.

During the first three months of 2004 Diamond served as Senior Advisor on governance to the coalition provisional authority in Baghdad. He has also worked with a group of Europeans and Americans to produce the *Transatlantic Strategy for Democracy and Human Development in the Broader Middle East* published in 2004 by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. During 2004-'05 he has been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on the United States Policy Toward Arab Reform. With Professor Abbas Mulanni he is initiating a new project of the Hoover Institution examining the conditions and prospects for democracy in Iran.

Diamond has lectured, taught, and conducted research in some twenty-five countries over the past thirty years including as a Fulbright Visiting Professor at Biyaro

University in Kano, Nigeria, and as a visiting scholar at the Sinyatshan Institute of the Academia Sinyeka in Taipan, Taiwan.

He is the author, most recently, of *Squandered Victory: The America Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq* published this year. *Developing Democracy toward Consolidation, Promoting Democracy* in the 1990s; *Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives* published in 2000 and 1999; and *Class Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, The Failure of the First Republic* published in 1988. He is also the lead editor of the series of volumes *Democracy in Developing Countries* which has produced three regional volumes and six books since it was first published in 1989. He has edited more than twenty other edited works including *Political Parties and Democracy, Consolidating Democracy in Korea, Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation*, also in Korea, *Elections and Democracy in Greater China, The Self-Restraining State, Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, and with Mark Platner he has edited eleven *Journal of Democracy* collections including *Democracy in East Asia, in Africa, the Global Divergence of Democracies, Democracy After Communism*.

And lest one think, and by the way that's genuinely the tip of the iceberg, lest one think he has sacrificed quantity to quality, just listen. Otin Merenin in his review of his first book, *Class Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, The Failure of the First Republic* points out: "Despite its unresolved theoretical ambiguities and because of its scope and ambition to explain both Nigeria and democracy, this book will stand as a richly informed, theoretically sophisticated, and elegantly written and argued introduction to and summary of the fate of democracy during the formative years of the Nigerian Republic." Lucian Pye in his review of *Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume 3*,

*Asia* published a year later characterizes the results of the efforts as “a superb political history and analysis of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Papua, New Guinea, and Indonesia.” He concludes calling it “the best recent general political history and analysis of individual Asian countries.” Adrian Marriage in his review of *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, Themes and Perspectives* which Larry Diamond co-edited with Mark Platner, he characterizes Diamond’s introduction as “positively magisterial” appropriate enough for this redoubtable champion of democracy. Timothy Power sees his *Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation* as providing an unparalleled overview of democratization in the late twentieth century and beyond, adding that “it is likely to become a classic in the field of comparative studies” and that it “represents the state of the art in the study of global democratization.” Even Machiko Kachutani, the book critic from the *New York Times* famous for not liking anyone and who seems to carve up political texts with a particular relish loved *Squandered Victory*.

When I finally discovered a review of *Squandered Victory* on a site called “The Journal with Jesus, Book Notes” I thought, aha, I had finally found a source which might not love Larry Diamond, only to find a particularly nuanced appreciation. The reviewer is someone named Dan Klendenan. This is him: “In late 2003, Condoleezza Rice telephoned her friend and Stanford colleague Larry Diamond of the Hoover Institution to ask him to go to Iraq as a Senior Advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Although he had opposed the war with Iraq, after the fact he considered it a moral imperative to do everything within our power to establish a democracy there. As an expert in democratic development around the world, both as a scholar and advisor,

practitioner on the ground, few people are more qualified. He believed the Iraqis truly wanted democracy and were willing to work for it. He clearly has no axe to grind, no compulsion to justify or condemn; nor did he think the task was hopeless, at least when he went. He believed our intentions were good and he is eager to give credit to the CPA and Iraqis where it is due. Diamond spent four months in Baghdad and I think it is safe to say that few people worked harder or with more conviction, passion, enthusiasm and sense of duty than he did. What makes this work compelling is his unique qualifications and inspirational dedication to the task.”

What this formidable array of facts does not capture is the elegance of mind and character that informs his work and his life. His effortless movement between the philosophical, theoretical, historical and empirical; the precision, clarity and sure-footedness with which he navigates the treacherous terrain of democracy theory with a seemingly impenetrable forest of variables and contingencies. His brilliance at constructing taxonomies to guide analysis and inquiry juxtaposed with the profound, thorough-going understanding role of the contingent, the open-ended, what he calls a developmental view of democracy makes one rub one’s eyes. To borrow the words and, alas, the sentence structure from Henry James. But even in his most theoretical moments, the actuality of the world is always close at hand as he reminds us that democracy is always about human beings making choices. “Democratic change,” in his words, “is produced not by abstract historical and structural forces,” master as he himself is of abstraction and structure, but, he goes on “by individuals and groups choosing, innervating, taking risks.” Increasingly for him democracy was best understood as “a continuum and process rather than a system that is simply either present or absent.” And

he knows whereof he speaks. For while second to none in the world of the scholar/writer, he is equally adept, articulate and present in the messy turbulence, the terror and exhilaration of the world of action. His emails from Iraq are unforgettable in their immediacy, vividness, energy; their shifting moods of exhilaration, rage, hope, despair, pain, and laughter. Would that they could be captured on phrase or two for they are a revelation of what it takes to move between these worlds as he does. The formidable intelligence, the range of humanity, the order of decency.

Larry Diamond's contributions to the subject of democracy both theoretically and in its myriad embodiments around the world, his magnificent contribution to extending and deepening our appreciation and understanding of the role of the international community in living and learning democracy makes it evident why we are particularly fortunate in having him open this conference. In the grace with which he traverses the worlds of thought and action, his predilection toward understanding that the world is open-ended, his preference for situations where risk and dream are in close proximity, he expresses the very soul of this College and, most particularly, the aspirations of its recently initiated Democracy Project.

It is, thus, a very, very special pleasure as well as an honor to warmly welcome Larry Diamond to Bennington College for the purpose of celebrating this inaugural moment of the Democracy Project. Larry Diamond.

LARRY DIAMOND: Well, I can assure you I do not deserve such an introduction, which is the most generous and eloquent introduction I've ever had and I've been doing a lot of speaking for quite a number of years now. But, nevertheless, Liz, I thank you from

the bottom of my heart for it. It does leave me feeling very ambivalent, however, because now for the first time I'm really regretting that you're the president of Bennington College because I have a lot of speaking to do in the next couple of months and it would be great if you could just travel around with me and introduce me at each place.

I also really am deeply honored and excited to be with you for this event, this inaugural event and this gathering of democrats from several different countries and life experiences. I remember talking with Liz some time ago now when this was sort of a gleam in the eye and I thought, 'wow, this is daring and deeply exciting; profoundly innovative,' which is, of course what Bennington College is all about, and 'something that people are bound to model.' And we're already seeing indications of that in a variety of ways. So, to be able to be a part of this is something that I'm personally very excited about.

I want to talk to you about quality and democracy and link those two words and convey to you something about the latest collaborative project I'm involved with which is about to be published next month by Johns Hopkins University Press as our latest Journal of Democracy book, *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*. On the one hand I am tempted to present a very academic paper which I was trying frantically to chop down on the airplane to spare you the agony of having to listen to an academic paper, so I was urged instead to be creative, and I will do so by beginning to talk not about the developing democracies that I've been writing about for the last quarter century of so but about the still developing democracy that I've been living in all my life and that, after all, this College is still located in unless there's been a border change at some point in the coming

years and use that as my take off to discuss conceptually and theoretically this problem that I think must be addressed if we're going to learn about democracy, must be engaged if we are going to compare experiences of democratic performance and development. And which we increasingly as social scientists and thinkers about democracy and doers of democracy are finding useful because it so readily breaks down the barriers between new and old democracies, established and emerging democracies, and the potential fatal arrogance of thinking that now that we have or have had for 200 years an established democracy that it is necessarily the model for the rest of the world or something that doesn't have very serious problems of its own.

I think our own democracy in the United States does have very serious problems, of course everyone does in its own way or another but I think in some respects ours are becoming more serious and that the quality of the democracy in the United States is wanting and, in some cases, receding. And my message is where I'll begin and end and is one I think resonates very well with the nature of Bennington College and the philosophy of this project, that we have to do something about it. Of course, the first thing is to understand and learn about it – empirically and theoretically – but we have to do something about it as citizens and I think this requires the re-energization of civic activism, the rediscovery of our ties as citizens and the development of a serious and intelligent agenda for reform that cuts across the traditional partisan boundaries and ideologies.

What are the problems? Well, you could start with competitiveness and look at our congressional districting in the United States and in most states systems of state legislative districting as well because we have a system of single member districts in the

United States where district boundaries need to be drawn one way or another and increasingly they are being drawn in extremely partisan ways that are squeezing out the scope for real political competition and choice. Now, let me say it's been for a very long time in the United States – most of our history – a partisan exercise to draw district boundaries in ways that will favor the incumbents, usually in the state legislatures who are drawing these boundaries. The word gerrymander, as you know, dates back if I'm recalling correctly to Mr. Gerry N. Britton in the early nineteenth century when this manipulation and, I think, compromise of democracy was first invented. But something has happened in the last ten to fifteen years that has made this a particularly outrageous and, for the quality of democracy in the United States, debilitating scandal. And it is actually quite fascinating. It's the growth of computer technology and the availability of all forms of information – computerized in a spatial way with highly sophisticated, increasingly sophisticated, in a cold, abstract perspective, admirable technically sophisticated models to predict how different tracts of territory will vote in congressional and state legislative elections. And when you've got this powerful information, so highly concentrated and manipulable through computers and statisticians and this armada of model building, you can virtually guarantee the outcome in 90 percent or more of the congressional districts in the United States these days if you're willing to be cynical enough and ruthless enough to ignore any other consideration of geographically, contiguity or history or logic or, for example, democratic choice and competitiveness to ensure incumbents as high a probability of reelection as possible and to ensure the party that controls the state legislature – if one party does – the maximum amount of party advantage. And, by the way, if you fail to win clear and unambiguous control of the state

legislature but do it or do it better a couple of years later, you can always do what Tom DeLay did in Texas and do the exercise all over again outside of the usual ten year period of time for the most naked and most indefensible partisan advantage.

So that's one problem that we have in the United States, that our elections, in one sense, are increasingly undemocratic because it is only democratic voters in a primary election of republican voters in a primary election that are having any choice, realistically, in determining the outcome.

Now, democracy is most of all – if it is nothing else – a system in which people can choose their leaders and replace their leaders in regular, free, and fair elections. So competition is vital. And I've suggested that there are problems with the competitiveness of our elections. There are problems, as well, with the transparency of our elections increasingly and their integrity, sufficient to make me wish that we could get some international, electoral observation of our own elections here in the United States. I think you know what I'm talking about in one or two of our recent presidential elections, I don't need to go into those details. But let me just, as long as we're thinking comparatively at this conference, observe a simple and, I think for our international observers, a fairly obvious fact. In most democracies in the world today, particularly those that are making progress in improving their quality of democracy, elections are administered by an independent, neutral electoral administration. Now, it's usually also a national electoral administration which sets uniform standards of transparency, accountability and so on. Even a democracy as large as India, and in terms of population you can't get any larger in the world today than India's democracy. I think you may one day when China becomes a democracy but by then, actually, India may have more

people. Physically, in terms of territory, India is a pretty big place; nevertheless, they have a single national electoral administration with common standards and absolute independence. It's really a civil service function. And there are many countries in the world where the integrity and independence of the electoral administration is guaranteed in the constitution through a variety of very clever mechanisms that involve a role for the Supreme Court to appoint the members of the committee or other layers of insulation from partisan politics. Who runs elections in the United States?

Well, I can tell you who does it in the State of California and I think we can all remember from the year 2000 who did it in the State of Florida. And if you look very carefully about who administered elections in the State of Ohio in 2004, you basically get the answer. They're partisan electoral officials, Secretaries of State usually elected on a party platform. Now, what sense does it make if this is the most vital and sensitive function of democracy for an elected official by the people from a political party with an obvious stake in the outcome to be in charge of making often consequential choices about how elections will be conducted? Add to that the problem that we're moving now in the wake of the fiasco that was the Florida election in 2000, away from any kind of paper ballot that could have those dreadful hanging chads to electronic voting. Now, I'm a modern person, I have an Ipod, I have nothing against electronic voting but one of the fundamental principles of democracy is the need for transparency and accountability.

Transparency means you can see what's happening. It's visible to everybody. Accountability means answerability, which means you can go back and review what was done and hold people accountable for their conduct and correct any mistakes or injustice that was done. How can we do this in the United States of America if we're using voting

machines that leave no record? No paper trail at all. Now, it just so happens, as many people in this room know, that some of these voting machines – including the ones that were used in a rather close election in the State of Ohio which returned the President of the United States to a second term with a very narrow margin in the electoral college – were manufactured by a company that is a major contributor to the Republican party. I am not saying that there was any fraud or wrongdoing in the State of Ohio in 2004 in this regard, but I am saying it's a travesty for the quality of democracy in this day and age in the most important and longest established democracy in the world that we should be using any method of voting that is not accountable, that is not subject to review and inspection and that is not transparent.

Look at the way we fund our political campaigns in the United States. Most democracies in the world now have some system for public funding of electoral campaigns. It's a broken process nearly everywhere and I would welcome reflections upon it from the participants in our conference here from other countries. But we have absolutely no system for publicly funding any campaigns other than that for President of the United States. And, as a result, money dominates elections in this country to an obscene degree. You know, members of Congress are only present when they are in town at all for a period of time from Tuesday to Thursday. Most of them are gone the rest of the time, and that's because they have to be back home in their district raising money, particularly if they are in the Senate – little less so for those who hold the 90 percent of seats in the United States of America that are not competitive in the House of Representatives or at least have not been very much so. But many other public officials, elected officials, have to run permanent campaigns. It's an astonishing thing to see a

recently elected member of the Senate to a six-year term raising money in the first or second year of his or her term. But if you're from a big industrial state and you're going to need 10 or 20 million dollars in order to wage a competitive campaign, do the math on how much money you have to raise every week over six years in order to get to that threshold. It's not surprising that the Senate is increasingly becoming, to a degree never before seen in our history, a club of millionaires who can self-fund their campaigns.

Now, let me say that I have nothing against millionaires. I think many of them are civically minded and have much to contribute to our public life. But it shouldn't be the case that money should so advantage who can make a decision about running for office and that it should be a factor that drives many good people from choosing not to run for office for the simple reason draining politically neutralizing process of having to raise all this money.

And then there is the iron triangle of influence that revolves, again, not without precedent in our history, certainly, but I think to an increasingly undemocratic degree around a single street in Washington, D.C. called K Street. This is where the lobbyists sit in their modern glass office buildings plotting to buy influence in our regulatory agencies and on Capital Hill. And I'm not singling out any party here nor am I singling out any party in what I've said before. The diminution of American democracy has been very much a bi-partisan process and a bi-partisan, frankly, conspiracy and it manifests itself on K Street with a revolving circle of people moving from Congress to the halls of the lobbyists, from the regulatory agencies and departments of government to the bodies that they were regulating – okay, they have to wait a year before they can have any contact with their former agency. How long is that in the life of a lobbyist? So, you've got this

connection between business, private business, lobbyist, politically connected and the elected and appointed public officials who are being received by them.

Now, have you looked recently at who's working for these lobby firms? It's very interesting. It's not just the former public officials and members of Congress and so on. It's their sons and daughters and spouses. The sons and daughters and spouses, even, of many serving politicians, like the current Speaker of the House of Representatives. And many, many others from both parties. So, how independent can our public officials be from the undue and, in a way, inevitably corrupt exercise of influence when their family members are working in this revolving door and this iron triangle and registering all this influence. Is it any wonder that we have the levels of cynicism about public life, the decline in voter turnout, the decline in participation, the decline in public confidence, the disillusionment with and distrust of parties and politicians that we have, not just in the United States, it's very much an international phenomenon. I recommend to you the book by Robert Putnam and Susan Farr which they edited a few years ago on disaffected democracies looking at quite a number of advanced industrial democracies and finding these common trends. And I refer you to the public opinion survey data that we have from the post-communist countries, from Latin America and the Latino barometer, from Africa and the Afro-barometer, from East Asia barometer that I've been involved with including Indonesia and you see to varying degrees but a common trend of after the euphoria of the transition, declining confidence in parties and politicians. I mean, there are some countries where you'd be hard pressed to find 10 percent of the public who say that they have a significant amount or a lot of trust or confidence in political parties and the parliament.

Now I think a certain amount of distrust is actually healthy; it's called healthy skepticism, but the levels of disillusionment that we have in democracies around the world is very unhealthy. First of all because it reflects in empirical reality of corruption, influence pedaling and lack of effective access of the people to power and to justice. And, second of all, because it deepens their disenchantment and their deep politicization and therefore you have a revolving or interacting or reinforcing process of corruption and poor performance of democracy, depoliticizing people and the withdrawal of people from civic life and activism, giving more and more space to the politicians to be corrupt and unaccountable.

Now, the implication of this is not necessarily alarming but I do think it's disturbing and it's also humbling for Americans who've been very busy during this third wave of global democratization, this inspiring and uplifting trend in the world over the last thirty years in which, beginning with the Portuguese Revolution in 1974, more and more countries have become democratic. About three times as many as were in 1974 to the point where barely a quarter of the independent states in the world were democratic in 1974 and about 60 percent of all the independent states in the world are now. And a lot of this expansion of democracy in the world has been advanced, inspired and stimulated by the United States and other advanced industrial democracies by their model, by their moral support, by their practical forms of assistance to democrats in civic organizations, democracy movements and political parties – a number of whom are actually with us from these four countries at this conference. And there has been a tendency to wallow in self-congratulation about that, to become rather boastful and arrogant, to think that we could actually remake the world in our image any time we would like to by any means

possible that helped to generate the debacle that is Iraq right now for the United States. Only hope to because if you really want to understand that debacle you have to go back to the diminished quality of democracy in the United States. I haven't even talked about the timidity of our media in the United States, the increasing corporate takeover of our media in the United States, and the lack of questioning and aggressiveness that we've seen in recent years as a result of these trends and the lack of real, hard questions that were asked on the floor of the Congress in advance of this venture.

Now what are the implications of this, as they say in Latin America, 'desencanto' (disenchantment) with democracy. Well, for us in the United States and western Europe it means we have a diminished quality of democracy and if we value democracy, participation, freedom, civic engagement, that's enough for us to be concerned. In fact, even if I have exaggerated the situation and, if anything, honestly, I think I've underplayed it but there's no time to go into the full scope of squeezing out of the vibrancy and life of democracy that we have suffered in the United States I think in the last couple decades. Even if I'm exaggerating it, we can do better; we should do better. We should be one type of model for the world, and every country can do better. Every democracy in the world can be more democratic, more inclusive, more participatory, offering more choice to their citizens, more accountability vertically and horizontally, more transparent, less corrupt – corruption will never be eliminated anywhere in the world and therefore it is a constant struggle and any country can always be less corrupt and therefore serve the public interest better because private interests are less often being served under the table. Every country can become more just and more equal.

Now, some are a lot more so than the United States, of course, and some are a lot less so; and we will never have perfect equality in the world. That was one of the illusions of socialism that I think that has been permanently and wisely buried. But even if you conceive of democracy as a political system without any necessary social and economic implications, the political equality of all citizens does really require some floor of minimum dignity for all people and minimum access to health, education most of all, and life chances if people are to have reasonably equal opportunities as citizens to exercise influence over the political process. And to say we don't have that in the United States today, I think, just look at what happened in Hurricane Katrina and who got evacuated when, is a vast understatement. So we have a lot of work to do in the United States and, frankly, in Western Europe and Japan and other long-established democracies as well.

But the issue I am raising for you is even more urgent for some of the emerging democracies of the world where they have had an unusual space of time in which democracy could grow and thrive without [I have some water, thank you] without challenge from ideological competitors because of the implosion of communism and surviving a number of threats that one would not have expected them to. Frankly, if I may say so, and I think Gustavo Beliz and his Argentine colleague would probably back me up on this but if you don't please say so, if Argentina had gone through a generation or two earlier the depth of economic depression, fiscal disarray, corruption scandals, irregular transfers of executive power that it suffered in the last decade and the kind of corruption that existed under a certain president, there would have been a military coup. Military would be back in power, human rights would be massively violated again, and

the world would be figuring out how to get back to civilian constitutional rule. That did not happen; it has not happened for the most part virtually throughout Latin America and, indeed, the striking thing about this third wave of democratization is not only how broad it has been, touching every region of the world except the Arab Middle East until perhaps very recently with the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, but how resilient it has been. There have been very few breakdowns of democracy, and the ones that have occurred, for example in Turkey in 1980, have largely been reversed now into new democratization. There are very few democracies in the world that have broken down during this period, only a handful, and are still not returned to democracy – Russia and Pakistan are two of the prominent ones; Venezuela is an ambivalent case.

Now, these two facts – steady expansion in the number of democracies in the world, a widespread and inspiring growth in the norms of democracy in the world, to the point now where really democracy is the only broadly legitimate form of government in the world and rightly so, and the relative absence of blatant reversals of democracy – particularly through the old-fashioned means of military rule – have lead to a certain complacency: democracy is here to stay. Well, if you take the long historical view, nothing is necessarily here to stay, and certainly not a political system as complex, in some ways delicate, and ultimately dependent on the will of the people, as democracy. So if we continue to witness low levels of democratic quality in many of the new democracies that have emerged, recurrent high levels of corruption, lack of accountability, lack of real vigor in the degree of competitiveness of public life, and a general sense that there is a self-seeking, unaccountable, self-enriching political class that controls the political system, maybe not just one party but several again in a kind of

mutual conspiracy of power, don't assume that all these democracies are going to be there indefinitely. They may not be and we cannot anticipate now what will be the ideology that arises to challenge them. At least we can't anticipate it in that section of the world, a majority of world that is not predominantly Muslim. We know what it is right now in that broad swath of the world from Indonesia to Morocco where there are large numbers of countries that are predominantly Muslim. The challenger will be radical, reactionary, anti-democratic, extremist Islam mobilized and twisted for the pursuit of a new kind of millenarian hegemony. And we need to take this, for the moment, very seriously as a competitor to democracy and we need to take the possibility of new forms of anti-democratic movement seriously if we don't get serious about improving the quality of democracy.

Now, it may surprise you to know that I am only on page two of a forty-page presentation that I was going to present to you today. But, since I've been urged to be creative, I will actually stop at this point and conclude with where I began, which is the way this essay concludes and, as I said if you're interested in getting the details in an intellectual framework of the quality of democracy or are reflections on the dynamics of it, our book *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* will be published next month by Johns Hopkins University Press and our essay by Leonardo Morlino, my collaborator on this project from the University of Florence and myself on the quality of democracy with some of our thematic essays were actually published in the October 2004 *Journal of Democracy*, so much of this is already available.

My concluding point is really the appeal that I had articulated before and I think that is very much the spirit that infuses this conference. If something is going to be done

about the deteriorating quality of democracy and the draining away of accountability, progress in a sense, equality, justice, transparency and vigor – real kind of active vigor in our democracy – we are going to have to do it. It's not going to come as a gift from above by enlightened politicians; they're too trapped, even if they're good people and some of us know very good people sitting in the Congress – they are too trapped in this web of influence and in the incentives that are generated by the way our elections are done and funded and structured and the way news does or does not get reported these days. So we need, not only in Indonesia and Turkey and Poland and Argentina, but we need in the United States and I think in most democracies throughout the world a real revolution or revival of civic engagement for your countries paralleling the emotion and breadth of the transitions to democracy in the popular movements for them for our country renewing the spirit that we saw in the Civil Rights Movement, in the anti-war movement, and maybe – and I don't want to leave any implication of violence – but maybe in its idealism and willingness to sacrifice in the American Revolution.

Thank you.